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Abstract
According to the semantic view, a theory is characterized by a class
of models. In this paper, we examine critically some of the assumptions
that underlie this approach. First, we recall that models are models of
something. Thus we cannot leave completely aside the axiomatization of
the theories under consideration, nor can we ignore the metamathemat-
ics used to elaborate these models, for changes in the metamathematics
often impose restrictions on the resulting models. Second, based on a par-
allel between van Fraassen’s modal interpretation of quantum mechanics
and Skolem’s relativism regarding set-theoretic concepts, we introduce a
distinction between relative and absolute concepts in the context of the
models of a scientific theory. And we discuss the significance of that dis-
tinction. Finally, by focusing on contemporary particle physics, we raise
the question: since there is no general accepted unification of the parts
of the standard model (namely, QED and QCD), we have no theory, in
the usual sense of the term. This poses a difficulty: if there is no theory,
how can we speak of its models? What are the latter models of? We con-
clude by noting that it is unclear that the semantic view can be applied
to contemporary physical theories.
Keywords: semantic view, Skolem’s paradox, modal interpretation, theo-
ries, particle physics.
Resumo
De acordo com a abordagem semaˆntica das teorias cient´ıficas, uma
teoria e´ caracterizada por uma classe de modelos. Neste artigo, discu-
timos algumas hipo´teses que subjazem a essa concepc¸a˜o. Em primeiro
lugar, recordamos que modelos sa˜o modelos de algo, e portanto na˜o pode-
mos desconsiderar a axiomatizac¸a˜o das teorias consideradas, bem como a
metamatema´tica usada para elaborar esses modelos, uma vez que uma mu-
danc¸a na metamatema´tica pode ocasionar restric¸o˜es nesses modelos. Em
seguida, baseados em um paralelo poss´ıvel entre a interpretac¸a˜o modal
da MQ de van Fraassen e o relativismo dos conceitos conjuntistas de
Skolem, sugerimos que dever´ıamos considerar, tambe´m no que diz re-
speito a`s teorias e seus modelos, uma poss´ıvel distinc¸a˜o entre conceitos
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relativos e absolutos. Finalmente, levando em conta a presente f´ısica de
part´ıculas, colocamos uma questa˜o que nos parece ba´sica: uma vez que na˜o
ha´ unificac¸a˜o aceita universalmente das partes que constituem o chamado
modelo standard, a saber, a eletrodinaˆmica quaˆntica e a cromodinaˆmica
quaˆntica, na˜o temos aqui uma teoria, no sentido usual que se emprega esse
termo nas discusso˜es em filosofia da cieˆncia. Isso coloca um problema: se
na˜o ha´ teoria, como falar em seus modelos? Modelos de queˆ? Conclu´ımos
observando que na˜o e´ claro como a visa˜o semaˆntica das teorias cient´ıficas
se aplica a`s teorias f´ısicas de hoje.
Palavras-chave: abordagem semaˆntica, paradoxo de Skolem, interpretac¸a˜o
modal, teorias, f´ısica de part´ıculas.
1 Considerations on the semantic approach
As is well known, the motto of the semantic approach to scientific theories is that
a theory is characterized by a class of models. The word “model” is, of course,
used in distinct ways in the current literature. According to Suppes, the main
forerunner of the semantic view, the various kinds of ‘models’ we consider, e.g. in
biological and social sciences, in applied mathematics and in other areas, can be
reduced to set-theoretic models, that is, to mathematical structures satisfying
the theory’s postulates (or equivalently, satisfying the set-theoretic predicate
that axiomatizes the theory). As he says, “a possible realization of a theory is a
set-theoretic entity of the appropriate logical type” (Suppes 2002, p. 21). Van
Fraassen acknowledges this point by noting that “[a]ny structure that satisfies
the axioms of a theory [. . .] is called an model of that theory” (van Fraassen
1980, p. 43). However, he seems to take the point back, when he asserts that
“[t]he semantic view of theories makes language irrelevant to the subject”, and
that Suppes’ idea is that “to present a theory is to define a class of its models
directly, without paying any attention to questions of axiomatizability” (van
Fraassen 1989, p. 222, emphasis in the original).
But it’s important to acknowledge that models are models of something, and
that in Suppes’ approach (which van Fraassen endorses in part), the models in
question are models of a set-theoretic predicate (a suitable formula written in
the language of set theory) which stands for the conjunction of the theory’s
postulates. Suppes’ slogan is that “to axiomatize a theory is to define a set-
theoretic predicate” (ibid., p. 30). Thus, language is of fundamental importance
in this approach, and so are the theory’s postulates. Without the latter, there
are no models of a theory, for there are no models tout court. The models must
be collected in some way to form the extension of the relevant set-theoretic
predicate. In general, we have a proper class whose elements are precisely the
models of the predicate.
Although the point can be resisted, it is generally agreed by the defenders of
the semantic view that the relevant models are mathematical structures. But
mathematical structures are built in a suitable mathematical framework. De-
pending on the theory we are considering, we have several possible alternatives
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for this (meta)mathematical framework, such as higher-order logics or category
theory. However, typically these mathematical structures are set-theoretic, that
is, built in a certain set theory. Usually, the framework that is employed is
informal (non-axiomatized) set theory. But if pressed, the scientist can turn,
say, to ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory. (By the way, this point was made by
Patrick Suppes in conversation with one of us, DK.)
Thus, we should acknowledge that the models of a certain scientific theory
T are usually built in a certain set theory. For the sake of precision and without
loss of generality, we can assume that set theory to be ZF. In this case, “clas-
sical particle mechanics” (that is, the models of a classical particle mechanics)
emerges from structures of the form 〈P,−→s ,m,−→f ,−→g 〉, where P is the set of
“particles”, −→s is the position function, m is the mass function, −→f stands for
the internal forces, and −→g represents the external force function—all of them
obeying certain postulates (Suppes 2002, pp. 319ff). As for non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, a mathematical structure that can be taken as a model of
this theory is: 〈M0, S,Q0, . . . , Qn, ρ〉, where M0, the mathematical part of the
structure, is a model of standard functional analysis, while 〈S,Q0, . . . , Qn〉 is
the “operative part” of the structure, and ρ is an interpretation function that
assigns an element ofM0 to each element of the operative part—once again, each
of these components also obey specific postulates (Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di
Francia 1981, p. 85). As we see, there is sensitivity to language, and there is a
(meta)mathematical framework in which these structures are built.
But this approach faces considerable problems, particularly if we take into ac-
count contemporary physics. Here, we will only raise the issues without detailed
discussion. Our first problem concerns the mathematics used in the metatheory;
that is, the set theory we employ to build the models of a given theory. Let’s
consider an example. An important concept in quantum mechanics is that of
an unbounded operator. For instance, the position and momentum operators in
the Hilbert space L2(R) of the equivalence classes of square integrable functions
are unbounded; that is, if A is an operator, then for any M > 0 there exists
a vector α such that ‖A(α)‖ > M‖α‖. However, consider the theory ZF+DC,
where DC stands for a weakened form of the axiom of choice entailing that
a ‘countable’ form of the axiom of choice can be obtained. (In particular, if
{Bn : n ∈ ω} is a countable collection of nonempty sets, then it follows from
DC that there exists a choice function f with domain ω such that f(n) ∈ Bn for
each n ∈ ω.) It can then be proven, as Solovay showed, that in ZF+DC (which is
supposed to be consistent) the proposition “Every subset of R is Lebesgue mea-
surable” cannot be disproved. This proposition is false in standard ZFC. The
same happens with the proposition: “Each linear operator on a Hilbert space
is bounded” (Maitland Wright 1973). This kind of result poses a difficulty to
the defenders of the semantic view: when we speak of the models of a scientific
theory, such as quantum mechanics, which metamathematics should we use to
define its models? Presumably, it cannot be Solovay’s model in ZF+DC, since
we need unbounded operators. So, the choice of a suitable metamathematics is
crucial.
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Here is another example. In the standard Hilbert space formalism, we deal
with bases for the relevant Hilbert spaces. More specifically, we deal with or-
thonormal bases formed by eingenvectors of certain Hermitean operators. This
is possible because we can prove, using the axiom of choice (which is part of the
metatheory used here) that any Hilbert space H has a basis. Moreover, it can
also be shown that each basis has a specific cardinality, which is the same for
all bases of H (this is defined to be the dimension of the space). But in certain
set theories in which the axiom of choice does not hold in full generality, such
as in Lau¨chi’s permutation models, we obtain: (a) vector spaces with no basis,
and (b) a vector space that has two bases of different cardinalities (Jech 1977,
p. 366). Now, if a vector space has no basis, it cannot be used as part of the
standard formalism of quantum mechanics. The latter formalism presupposes
the availability of suitable bases. As a result, the formalism depends crucially
on the metamathematics that is used.
It should be noted that, despite all the discussion about the concept of
‘model’ of a physical theory in the literature, the precise characterization of this
concept remains elusive. Model theory, which has been the inspiration for much
that has been said on models of scientific theories in general, articulates the
notion of a model for formal first-order axiomatic systems only. Due to the fact
that fundamental theorems, such as compactness, completness and Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem, do not hold in higher-order logics (with standard semantics), we can say
that there is no higher-order model theory. But scientific theories, in general,
are described only informally (consider, for instance, the theories in biology),
and involve more than first-order languages. As a result, we don’t have a corre-
sponding well defined “model theory” in such cases.1 Despite this, a model for
a scientific theory in standard texts on the semantic view, has been typically
taken in its “first-order” sense, roughly, as a set-theoretic structure that satis-
fies the axioms of the theory. Now, suppose that we are considering theories
that are stronger than first-order theories. Which metamathematical framework
should we use to describe their models? If we do not specify the metatheory that
we are using, we cannot guarantee that that certain entities—such as certain
models—that we assume that exist do in fact exist. Furthermore, important
concepts, such as the concept of truth (Tarskian or not), will depend on the
metamathematics too. To know the features of the metamathematics that is
used in the understanding of scientific theories seems to be central in philosophy
of science.
2 Skolem’s and van Fraassen’s paradox
Let us suppose that we have somehow solved the problem just raised, and so, we
have offered grounds to choose a suitable set theory, such as ZF (more precisely,
1Is has being claimed that the first (first-order) formal axiomatization of orthodox quantum
mechanics was proposed in [21]. We will not discuss this issue here.
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a particular model of ZF), as our metamathematical framework.2 Thus, we
may assume that we have a set-theoretic predicate and a class of models for this
predicate. We can now raise a problem related to Skolem’s concept of relative
and absolute concepts in set theory. But let us first contextualize the problem.
In the 1920’s, Thoraf Skolem realized that there are concepts that are, as it
were, the same in all models of, say, ZF (which is supposed to be consistent).
For instance, the concept of ‘ordinal’ does not change from model to model as
the concept of ‘cardinal’ does. For example, if ZF is formulated as a first-order
theory (as Skolem himself supposed), if consistent, it will have a countable
model due to the Lowe¨nheim-Skolem theorem. But, in this model, the set
of real numbers, which can be constructed in ZF, must be countable—a fact
that contradicts Cantor’s theorem, according to which there is no bijection
between the set of real numbers and the set of natural numbers. However, as
Skolem himself noted, this result does not lead to a “real” paradox, for the
bijection must exist outside the countable model (Skolem 1922). This result,
known as “Skolem’s paradox”, shows that the set of real numbers may have
different cardinalities depending on the model we consider, and this happens in
general for other sets. The concept of cardinal is relative (to the model under
consideration), while the concept of ordinal (which is “the same” in all models)
is absolute.
We will not examine here the formal definitions, keeping the discussion at
an intuitive level. But let us just give a short account on the relevant concepts
by considering a countable transitive model M of ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory with the axiom of choice). A formula ϕ(x, y) is absolute if for a, b ∈M ,
we have that M |= ϕ(a, b) iff ϕ(a, b) is in fact true (Burgess 1977, p. 408). For
example, the following formulas are absolute: y =
⋃
x, z = x∩y, z = x∪y, and
z = {x, y} (these expressions can be rewritten as formulas of ZFC, satisfying
the required condition). However, y = P(x) is not absolute. After all, y may
be the set of all subsets of x in the model M , without being the true power
set of x. So, card(x) < card(y) is not absolute, for even if there is no one-one
mapping of x onto y in M , this does not imply that the mapping does not exist
(recall Skolem’s paradox). How can these points be applied to our discussion of
scientific theories and their models?
To translate these points, that make sense in a precise context, to a general
discussion of theories and models in science is not a straightforward problem.
But, as will become clear, we can explore certain aspects of the technical re-
sults mentioned above. Let’s consider a situation that is similar to the one
above involving models of ZF. After having presented his modal interpretation
of quantum mechanics, Bas van Fraassen addresses the problem of identical
particles in quantum physics, which he regards as one of the three main issues
2When we speak of a “model” of a set theory such as ZF, we are not thinking of set-
theoretical structures, such as a structure G = 〈G, ∗〉, which can be a model for group theory,
where G is a nonempty set and ∗ a binary operation on G. The “models” of ZF cannot be
constructed as sets of ZF. These “models” are, in a certain sense, informal structures, built
in informal mathematics. They model a theory like ZF in the sense that we can “see” that
its axioms are (intuitively) true in those structures.
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in the philosophical discussion on quantum mechanics (see van Frassen 1991,
p. 193). And he notes: “identical particles [. . .] are certainly qualitatively the
same, in all the respects represented in quantum-mechanical models—yet still
numerically distinct” (ibid., p. 376). In a previous paper, he was still more
explicit, insisting that “if two particles are of the same kind, and have the same
state of motion, nothing in the quantum-mechanical description distinguishes
them. Yet this is possible” (van Fraassen 1984).
Van Fraassen’s quotations are intriguing. Particles of the same kind and
in the same state of motion are ‘identical’, in the physicists’ jargon, and ac-
cording to their standards, nothing can distinguish them. So, if they cannot
be distinguished in the quantum-mechanical formalism, how can they still be
distinguished at all? The answer, we suggest—following the parallel case made
by Skolem in set theory—is that the particles can be distinguished outside the
framework of quantum mechanics. But what does this mean? As we have seen,
in the foundations of set theory, considerations regarding what holds inside or
outside a certain model, are quite common. But can we make sense of this way
of speaking in philosophy of science as well?
In order to answer this question, recall that van Fraassen’s modal interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics takes quantum propositions as modal statements,
which give “first and foremost about what can and what must happen, and
only indirectly about what actually does happen” (van Fraassen 1980). In other
words, the modal account, by offering an interpretation of quantum mechanics,
spells out how the world could be if quantum mechanics were true (van Fraassen
1991, p. 242). To motivate his proposal, van Fraassen recalls one of the most
intriguing features of quantum physics, namely, the sense in which quantum
mechanics is an indeterministic theory. Although the dynamics of an isolated
system evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation (hence deterministically),
the system as a whole cannot be analyzed in terms of its component parts. So,
apparently, the quantum mechanical state of the whole system contains only in-
complete information about the system. Bohr’s proposal, recalls van Fraassen,
emphasizes that it is still possible to have complete information about the sys-
tem, given that the states of the system’s components and the state of the whole
system do not determine each other (van Fraassen 1980). As a result, on the
basis of the state of a complete system X+Y , we can in general ascribe at most
mixed states to X and Y , but from them nothing can be said back about the
state of the whole system. As van Fraassen notes:
[I]f we can predict the future states of an isolated system on the basis
of its present state [by means of Schro¨dinger’s equation], then how
can we be ignorant about the future events involving its components
unless the information in those total states is incomplete? For surely
any true description of a component is a partial but true description
of the whole? (ibid.)
Van Fraassen’s answer is obtained from a distinction between quantum dy-
namical states and experimental events. The former are what a vector or a
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statistical operator represents. They are things completely embedded in the
theory, whose evolution is governed by dynamical laws. In other words, we can
say that dynamical states are described in the formalism of quantum mechanics.
Events, on the contrary, are extra-theoretic entities that satisfy the probability
calculations.
The same conceptual distinction can be drawn by distinguishing between
state attributions and value attributions of a physical system. The former is
a theoretic construct, and part of the challenge involved in theory’s construc-
tion depends upon a proper representation of these states. Value attributions,
in turn, express values that an observable actually have. Since the point is
important for our argument, let us consider it in more detail.
A value state is specified by stating which observables have values and what
they are. A value-attributing proposition then states that an observable m ac-
tually has a value in a (Borel) set E. (In symbols, 〈m,E〉.) The connection
between them is that value states are truth-makers of value attributing propo-
sitions (van Fraassen 1991, pp. 275-276). On the other hand, we have the
dynamic state, which states how the system will evolve, either in isolation or
in interaction with another system. A state-attributing proposition then states
that a measurement of an observable m must have a value in a (Borel) set
E. (In symbols, [m,E].) Again, dynamic states and state-attributing propo-
sitions are connected by the fact that the former are what make the latter
true. Now, the crucial feature of the modal account is to distinguish value- and
state-attributing propositions. The motivation for this distinction comes from
difficulties faced by the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, as ar-
ticulated by von Neumann, for not distinguishing them (see van Fraassen 1991,
and Bitbol 1996).
Von Neumann’s interpretation of quantum mechanics identifies these two
concepts. After all, not only von Neumann considers that a system can be
said to posses a value of a certain variable when it is in an eigenstate of the
corresponding observable, but he also accepts that if the state vector is not an
eigenstate of some observable, then it has no value (van Fraassen 1991, and
Bitbol 1996, p. 149). In this case, the system is supposed to be characterized
by a well-defined value of the observable when the probability is 1. But if this
probability is not 1, then the observable is supposed to have no value at all.
To remove this discontinuity, van Fraassen offers an account according to which
probability ascriptions are not equivalent to value ascriptions (ibid.).
On von Neumann’s interpretation, attributions of values and classification
of states are closely related: an observable B has value b if and only if a B-
measurement is certain to have outcome b (where b is a real number). The
problem here is that in order to accommodate states for which measurement
has uncertain outcomes, von Neumann made a radical move: if the outcome of
a measurement of B is uncertain, B has no value at all (van Fraassen 1991, p.
274). To avoid this answer, the modal interpretation introduces the distinction
between values and states. With this distinction in place, the introduction of
‘unsharp’ values of observables is allowed. And this is how the possibility of
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uncertain outcomes in measurement can be accommodated.3 As van Fraassen
points out (1991, pp. 280-281), if a physical system X has dynamic state (rep-
resented by an operator) W at a time t, the state-attributions [M,E] which are
true are those such that Tr(WIM( E) = 1.
4 As opposed to state-attributions,
value-attributions cannot be deduced from the dynamic state. But, according
to van Fraassen, they are constrained in three ways:5 (i) If [M,E] is true, so
is the value-attribution 〈m,E〉; that is, observable M has value in E; (ii) all
true value-attributions could have probability 1 together; and (iii) the set of true
value-attributions is maximal with respect to feature (ii) (see van Fraassen 1991,
p. 281). So, the assignment of truth-conditions to state- and value-attributing
propositions is crucial to spell out the difference between them (the former, but
not the latter, can be deduced from the dynamic state).
To sum up, there is an important distinction between state attribution and
value attribution, or between states and events, and this distinction cannot be
reduced to something more basic. States, as already noted, are described in the
scope of (the formalism of) quantum mechanics by vectors of an appropriate
Hilbert space, while events are not. After all, events are statements such as:
Observable B pertaining to system X has value b, and such events are described
if they are assigned probabilities, but “they are not the same thing as the states
which assign them probabilities” (van Fraassen 1991, p. 279).
The distinction between states and events is similar to the distinction be-
tween absolute and relative notions in set theory discussed above, at least in
the following way: we are contrasting intra-theoretic properties with properties
that hold outside the models under consideration. It’s curious that when Skolem
introduced his ‘paradox’, he intended to use it to show the inadequacy of set
theory as a foundation for mathematics. The outcome, however, was precisely
the opposite. His result was incorporated as part of the rich conceptual frame-
work offered set-theoretic notions. Similarly, van Fraassen developed the modal
interpretation of quantum mechanics as part of a defense of an empiricist view.
In the end, however, the modal interpretation became part the revival of realist
interpretations of quantum theory.
It should now be clear that both in the philosophy of science and in the
foundations of set theory there is room for discussing what holds “inside” a
particular model (or formalism) and what holds “outside” the model (formal-
ism). If a theory is presented as a class of models, it makes perfect sense to ask
3Note that the value-state distinction is cashed out in terms of the concept of truth. The
relationship between these ideas and the concept of quasi-truth is developed in Bueno 2000.
4A few comments about the notation: (a) Tr is a linear functional of operators into numbers
(the trace map), which gives us the probability that a measurement of the observable m has a
value in the Borel set E; (b) IME is an Hermitean operator such that I
M
E (x) = x if M(x) = ax
for some a ∈ E, and is the null vector if M(x) = bx for some value b /∈ E, where M is the
Hermitian operator which represents m. (c) That the trace function Tr provides a probability
is due to the fact that Pmx (E) = (x · IME x) = Tr(IxIME ), where Pmx (E) is the probability that
a measurement of m has a value in E, (x · IME x) is the inner product of x and IME x and Ix
is the projection on the subspace [x] spanned by x. (For details, see van Fraassen 1991, pp.
147-152, 157-165, and 280-281).
5Which again are spelled out in terms of truth.
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whether there are concepts that remain the same in all models, and concepts
that change from model to model; that is, that have a certain extension “inside”
a model, but a different one in another model or when considered outside the
model.
To begin the search for examples, let’s examine a tentative case. Consider
the concept of indistinguishable (or indiscernible) object. The idea of indis-
cernibility is of fundamental importance in contemporary physics (for a histor-
ical account and further discussion, see French and Krause 2006). Standard
mathematics and classical logic imply that every object is an individual, in the
sense that each object can always be distinguished from any other.6 As a result,
to accommodate indistinguishable objects some mathematical trick needs to be
introduced.
In quantum physics, this is done by imposing some kind of symmetry con-
dition. Suppose we are to describe how two identical bosons, 1 and 2, can be
distributed in two possible states, A and B. As is well known, the vectors in
the relevant Hilbert space are |ψA1 〉|ψA2 〉, which states that both bosons are in
A; |ψB1 〉|ψB2 〉, which states that both are in B, and 1√2 |ψA1 〉|ψB2 〉+ 1√2 |ψA2 〉|ψB1 〉,
which states that one of them is at A and the another is in B. Thus, the indis-
tinguishability between 1 and 2 (in the third case) emerges from the symmetry
of the function, which is invariant by permutations of the labels. Some people
claim that the individuality of quantum objects is then lost. According to our
point of view, there is nothing to lose, for in one of the possible approaches to the
subject, these objects do not have identity to begin with (see French and Krause
2006). The artificiality of the problem is that these objects were first assumed
to be individuals by their labels 1 and 2. Thus, by an adequate choice of the
relevant vectors, we have made them indiscernible. However, the objects can-
not be said to be indiscernible outside the framework, since we can distinguish
them—e.g., by their labels 1 and 2. In this way, the notion of indistinguishable
object seems to be relative.
The mathematical trick we used consists in limiting the discourse to the scope
of a certain set-theoretic structure (as we saw, the models of quantum physics
can be taken to be such kind of structure). We then consider as indiscernible
those objects that are invariant by the automorphisms of the structure. Now,
in ZF any structure can be extended to a rigid structure, that is, to a structure
where the only automorphism is the identity function. Hence, in the rigid
structure (the whole ZF model V = 〈V,∈〉 is rigid), any object is an individual.
In short, there are no truly indiscernible objects in standard mathematics (and
logic).
Of course, we need to find more conclusive examples of absolute and relative
concepts in particular scientific theories. And to do that, the first step is to
characterize the relevant concepts in a precise way. Since the present paper is
just a preliminary piece, in which we just outline the main problems, we leave
the emerging details for another occasion.
6Although the concepts of individuality and distinguishability should not be confused; see
French and Krause op.cit.
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3 Driving without knowing how the car works
In discussing whether quantum field theory (QFT) needs a foundation, the
Nobel Prize winner Stanley Lee Glashow notes that, for many particle physicists,
QFT is just a useful tool, which is used without much concern for its logical
foundation. And he suggests that physicists generally work just like someone
who “drives without knowing how the car works” (Glashow 1999, p. 77). The
link between using a mathematical model and establishing it as a theory stricto
sensu is clearly described by him as follows:
[A] theory cannot become an established part of the scientific ed-
ifice until, first, its implications are shown to accord with experi-
ment, and, second, its domain of applicability is established. New-
tonian mechanics is absolutely true—within a well-defined envelope
defined by c and ~. Similarly for classical electrodynamics and non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. Like its predecessors, quantum field
theory offers—and will always offer—a valid description of particle
phenomena at energies lying within its own domain of applicability.
This domain extend all the way to the Planck scale, but its limits of
applicability have yet not be probed. From this point of view, we are
discussing the foundations of a theory that, whatever its successes,
cannot be accepted as true (Glashow 1999, p. 77).
The reason why Glashow thinks that QFT is not true is that the standard
model does not encompass gravitation. At Planck scale (near 10−33cm and
high energies), gravitation becomes important, but the unification between the
standard model of particle physics and general relativity has not been achieved
yet. Some physicists suggest that a new theory needs to be developed, and they
indicate possible directions to take, such as string theories, which describe “new”
symmetries called supersymmetries, and quantum gravitation. The future of
physics will show whether these proposals work.
The important point to us is that the standard model of particle physics—
which describes the weak, electromagnetic and strong interactions between the
most basic constituents of matter, leptons and quarks (Cottingham and Green-
wood 2007)—is formed by mainly two apparently irreconcilable “theories” (or
mathematical models): quantum electrodynamics (QED) and quantum chro-
modynamics (QCD). Both QED and QCD are used with great success, but
physicists acknowledge that there is no Grand Unified Theory (GUT) that satis-
factorily unifies both of them. In other words, we know quite well the symmetry
gauge group U(1) × SU(2) of QED, and the group SU(3) of QCD. However,
the unified group U(1)× SU(2)× SU(3) is still a mystery in the sense that the
resulting theory, whose laws would be invariant under this group, offers several
consequences not yet fully explained. Some physicists have proposed alterna-
tives to this unifying group, such as Glashow’s SU(5), but there is no general
agreement about this proposal. Glashow himself says that this “theory” is false,
given that protons live more than what is predicted by SU(5) (Glashow 1980).
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This means that we have no theory of the standard model in the strict sense
discussed above.
Even if we consider only QED, we should probably agree with Arthur Jaffe in
that “[a]s a consequence of renormalization, most physicists today believe that
the equations [we would say, “the postulates”] of quantum electrodynamics in
their simple form are inconsistent; in other words, we believe that the equations
of electrodynamics have no solution at all!” (Jaffe 1999, p. 136).7 A similar point
could be made about to the so-called M -theory, which would unify superstring
theories, and which is recognized as not complete, although it can be applied to
many physical situations.
All of this shows that scientists work by applying particular “mathematical
models” (a term that, in this context, is better than “theory”) to particular
situations—sometimes without paying attention to the fact that there are no
“theories”, in a strict sense, behind the mathematical frameworks they use. In
other words, we are driving to beautiful landscapes without the knowledge of
how our vehicle works. For instance, Tian Cao acknowledges that the unification
achieved by the standard model is only partial, for “the electroweak theory
and quantum chromodynamics (QCD) for the quark-gluon interaction are still
separate pieces” (Cao op.cit., p. 1). This apparent incompatibility does not
stop physicists of using both of them. As the Nobel Prize winner David Gross
notes: “there may be more than one, equally fundamental, formulation of a
particular QFT, each appropriate for describing physics at a different scale of
energy” (ibid., pp. 59-60). It seems that the axiomatization of theories (i.e. their
presentation as being grounded on principles or postulates) seems to come only
after their application in science; that is, after the application of mathematical
models suitable for specific situations.
Yuri Manin seems to be right here: we have learned much about formalisms
in the 20th century, but it is time to look to the world again—in order to get
additional motivations for mathematical theories (Manin 1976). The current
situation in physics seems to suggest that to formulate theories in the formal
way—that is, by presenting formally their language, axioms, and underlying
logics—seems to be an important goal to be pursued. But the risk is that, due
to quick progress in physics, the issue becomes a dead matter. To quote Cao
once more, perhaps we should agree that “a completely consistent theory [that
is, one formulated according to the strict logical standards] is a dead theory”
(op.cit., p. 281). We might even suggest that, due to the quick development of
science and due to the difficulties in developing axiomatic versions for new theo-
ries (the standard model,M -theory, etc.), scientists work as if the mathematical
models were kinds of mosaics to be placed together, even inconsistently, to solve
particular problems, or to “cover” a particular field of knowledge. As an illus-
tration, recall Bohr’s theory of the atom, which combines classical mechanics,
electrodynamics and quantization in an inconsistent way. In some cases, such
as in Bohr’s theory, we can formulate the theory in an axiomatic form, perhaps
7See also Jafee in Cao op.cit., p. 165, as well as discussions in the same volume by Schnitzer,
p.163, and Rohrlich, p. 257.
11
by using a non-classical logic—in the case of Bohr’s theory, a paraconsistent one
(see da Costa et al. 2007). However, in order to combine QED and QCD, no
proposed GUT has been universally accepted. The same difficulty is found, as
is well known, with quantum physics and general relativity.
Now, in cases such as these, if there are no theories, in a strict sense, how
can we speak of models? Of course, we can say that QCD applies to situations
involving high energies where asymptotic degrees of freedom are weakly coupled
(Gross ibid., p. 60). But in terms of models and the semantic approach, what
does this statement really mean? Can we simply say that all weak interactions
are models of QED? It seems that something is lacking here. In the end, it
seems to us that the semantic view of theories needs to be re-conceptualized in
light of current physics.
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